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Abstract 
As China’s economy, military, and regional power continue to grow, so do tensions between it 
and the United States. Long characterized as peaceful, China’s ascension to a world power has 
been accompanied by a marked increase in sophistication of its nuclear arsenal and strategy. 
China is currently developing stronger nuclear deterrents, and there have been calls from the 
Chinese military to shift its nuclear policy from a more passive strategy to a higher level of 
alertness, worrying US military planners. This research will delve into the background of 
China’s nuclear program, details of China’s current nuclear development, and the risk to global 
security that these developments present. 
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With the end of the Cold War in 1991, the threat of nuclear war seemed to disappear. 
Nuclear stockpiles stagnated and began to shrink, and trade expanded between former 
adversaries, particularly between the United States and China. Although the world is not free of 
nuclear weapons and the same nuclear doctrines that dominated the post WWII-era (such as 
mutually-assured destruction) are still in effect, nuclear apocalypse no longer appears to be on 
the forefront of international diplomacy. As a quasi-capitalist country, China appears more 
preoccupied with managing its economy than with spreading its political ideology. Despite their 
poor relations, Russia and the United States rarely discuss nuclear weapons outside of low-level 
arms reduction treaty talks. 
 However, there are undercurrents of a resurgence in nuclear tensions, particularly in East 
Asia: A slow nuclear arms race between China and the United States now appears to be 
intensifying. Not only do tensions remain high between the two countries, but territorial disputes 
and historical grievances between China and several US allies also still remain unresolved. One 
major source of tension is that China’s nuclear arsenal is both smaller and less technologically 
advanced than that of the United States. An American first-strike could potentially destroy 
China’s small nuclear stockpile, putting China at risk for a nuclear attack on its military or 
population centers. 
 Recent technological and policy developments have become a significant concern for the 
Chinese military. US military advancements and foreign policy decisions have led to a Chinese 
backlash, leading in part  to an increasing rate of expansion in both the size and sophistication of 
China’s nuclear arsenal. This paper will explore the military capabilities and organization of 
China’s nuclear program as well as the technical and policy changes that this program is now 
undergoing. 
IJOIS Fall 2016, Volume II 
Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security 
56 
 
Background on Chinese Nuclear Weapons 
China completed its first successful nuclear test in 1964 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2015). 
This was the culmination of 9 years of nuclear research, hampered by the withdrawal of Soviet 
technical assistance due to the Sino-Soviet split. Since its inception, the Chinese nuclear program 
had different goals and technical specifications than the US or Soviet programs. The primary 
focus, rather than offensive capabilities, was largely defensive in nature. Very shortly after China 
became a nuclear weapons state, it declared a no-first-use (NFU) policy, a policy that it has since 
maintained (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2016, p. 58). The NFU policy is a guarantee by 
China not to use nuclear weapons against other countries unless China is targeted by nuclear 
weapons first. China has additionally pledged not to launch strategic nuclear first-strikes against 
its enemies even during times of war, in contrast Soviet and American policies. 
 The rationale for China’s NFU policy stems back to Mao Zedong’s thoughts on nuclear 
weapons. Mao believed that nuclear weapons were mere “paper tigers,” weapons that appeared 
powerful but were not decisive in terms of international conflict and diplomacy. Mao wished for 
China to acquire nuclear weapons as a security precaution against American (and later Soviet) 
nuclear threats. China faced potential one-sided nuclear war during the Korean War and the 
Taiwan Straits Crisis; by developing nuclear weapons, China sought to dissuade the United 
States from launching a nuclear attack on China. This framed China’s nuclear program and its 
future developments: The Chinese nuclear program focused primarily on deterrence, and 
continues to do so (China Daily, 2015).  
Although China’s nuclear arsenal remained much smaller than the massive Soviet or 
American arsenals, China’s possession of nuclear weapons effectively ended the US experts’ 
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discussion of a nuclear attack on China. This arsenal did not need to be large, as its mere 
existence was enough to prevent a nuclear strike for fear of large-scale nuclear war. From there, 
China sought to increase the survivability of its arsenal in the event of a nuclear first-strike. 
China began developing (or copying from Soviet strategy) various methods to ensure that a 
nuclear first-strike could not destroy its nuclear arsenal, which would leave it essentially 
defenseless against follow-up strikes, such as mobile nuclear missiles and later nuclear 
submarines. 
 Recently, China’s level of nuclear organization has increased both technologically and 
structurally. Communication systems used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have 
improved in recent years, ensuring that they can remain functional in the event of a nuclear strike 
(Federation of American Scientists, 2000a). Control of China’s nuclear weapons has recently 
been given to the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, the successor to the Second Artillery 
Division (Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 2015).  
This branch of the military will have the same level of authority as the PLA (People’s 
Liberation Army, which is composed primarily of ground units), PLA Navy (PLAN), and the 
PLA Air Force (PLAAF). Nuclear weapons still play only a small role in Chinese strategic 
planning, but are nonetheless increasingly autonomous from other branches of the military. 
While China’s fledgling nuclear submarine fleet did not appear to be under the control of the 
Second Artillery Division, which was part of the PLA, they have now been given over to the 
Rocket Force. This indicates a consolidation of nuclear power under a single military branch, 
possibly due to the increased sophistication of China’s expanding nuclear triad. The Rocket 
Force will control both land- and sea-based missiles, as well as nuclear-capable bombers 
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(Kelsey, 2016). This consolidation reflects the increased sophistication of China’s nuclear 
strategy and organization. 
 Even so, China’s offensive nuclear measures remain generations behind the United 
States. China only developed and deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), capable 
of striking the entire United States in 1981, when the Dongfeng-5 (DF-5) ICBM reached initial 
operational capability (Federation of American Scientists, 2000b). China’s air and sea 
capabilities remain very vulnerable to conventional attack by the US military. Nevertheless, 
China has developed an impressive arsenal of nuclear missiles and delivery systems capable of 
striking potential enemies as well as nuclear strategies intended to keep its arsenal safe and ready 
for launch. 
Chinese Nuclear and Military Capabilities 
China does not publish records of its nuclear stockpile or most of its military capabilities, 
making it difficult to obtain concrete numbers; As a result, these estimates are somewhat 
speculative in nature. Nevertheless, satellite footage and public releases by the Chinese 
government provide rough information on China’s military developments. By observing China’s 
non-commercial nuclear reactors and estimating the size of its total load of fissionable material 
(nuclear material that can be made into nuclear weapons), the size of China’s nuclear arsenal can 
be calculated (International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2016). It is believed that China has 
around 260 nuclear weapons and a variety of delivery systems (Kristensen and Norris, 2015). 
These nuclear weapons are on a low-alert setting, often with the warhead and the missile stored 
separately (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015, p. 20). Most of 
China’s nuclear weapons are land-based, though China has been deploying submarine-launched 
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ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and the submarines necessary to deliver them. These delivery systems 
(while inferior to US systems) are capable of targeting any location in the United States with 
nuclear weapons and of resisting US first strikes. China’s nuclear arsenal is intended to deter a 
US first-strike that could destroy China’s retaliatory capabilities. 
 Most of China’s nuclear missiles are silo-launched, meaning that they are launched from 
land-based locations throughout China. China is believed to have between 75-100 ICBMs in 
total, all of them from the Dongfeng missile series (literally “East Wind”, to be referred to as 
DF) (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2016, p. 25). While China may have as many as 12 or 
13 varieties of land-based rockets, only the DF-5 and the DF-31A have the capacity to strike the 
United States (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2015). The DF-5 was first tested in 1971 and fully 
deployed 10 years later (Federation of American Scientists, 2000b). It comes in two varieties: the 
DF-5A, which has a single warhead, and the DF-5B, which carries multiple, independently-
targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The DF-5B is suspected to able to carry up to three 
warheads on a single missile, and therefore its destructive capability is vastly greater than the 
DF-5A. There are believed to be only 10 of each types of DF-5 missile, which have an estimated 
range of 12,000-15,000 km. Both are liquid-fuel rockets, meaning that the warheads are kept 
separate from the missiles. The fuel, which is corrosive to the missile itself, is stored separately 
on-site (Goldstein and Erickson, 2005, p. 15).  
As such, it could take several hours after approval has been granted to launch one of 
these missiles, making them vulnerable to a US first-strike. However, some of China’s nuclear 
missiles are mobile, meaning that they are mounted on trucks or other such vehicles equipped 
with mobile launching stations. The DF-31A is China’s primary mobile nuclear missile, and 
there are an estimated 25 such missiles that are operational (Federation of American Scientists, 
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1999a). The DF-31A has an estimated range of 10,000-14,000 km. China could have many of 
these nuclear weapons in motion on its vast highway system, from downtown Shanghai to the 
empty deserts of Xinjiang province. These vehicles are most likely located on the roads in the 
rural countryside, ensuring that these mobile nuclear weapons would almost certainly remain 
intact even if China were targeted by a nuclear strike. Critically, these rockets are some of the 
few in the Chinese arsenal that are solid-fuel rockets, meaning that the missile and warhead are 
stored together. If authorized, a DF-31A missile could be launched in a very short period of time, 
possibly minutes after launch approval was granted.  
 China is also in the process of developing ICBMs with longer ranges and improved 
accuracy. The DF-41 ICBM, which could have a range greater than that of the DF-5, is nearing 
completion and has been tested as a rail-mobile missile (Missile Threat, 2014). This would allow 
for China’s developed railroad system to be weaponized, housing ICBMs capable of targeting 
anywhere location in the United States while remaining untraceable due to the vast amount of 
trains on the rails at any given time. Although this project appears to be in the final stages of 
development, it will probably not replace the Chinese mobile arsenal for at least another few 
years. However, even in its current state, Chinese land-based ICBMs are essentially impossible 
to destroy in a first-strike, given the sheer size of China. This guarantees that a land-based 
deterrent will remain intact, even after an enemy first-strike. 
 China also possesses the capacity to deliver a nuclear strike using its Air Force assets. 
The PLAAF maintains some 120 H-6 bombers, which are essentially the Chinese version of the 
Russian Tupolev Tu-16 (Airforceworld.com). China is currently in the process of deploying the 
H-6K, which is specifically designed to be a long-range strategic bomber platform. The H-6K 
has the capability to carry up to six (or possibly seven, as sources conflict) cruise missiles that 
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could be fitted with nuclear warheads (military-today.com). It has a combat radius of 3,500 km, 
and its cruise missiles have an additional range of around 2,000 km, meaning that from mainland 
China it could strike targets as far as Alaska. While a bomber-based nuclear strike does not 
figure prominently in Chinese nuclear plans, China, like the United States, retains the capability 
to do so. 
Chinese Nuclear Submarine Development 
 Despite its strong land-based deterrent and growing air-based nuclear capabilities, fears 
of a successful US first-strike have led to Chinese development of sea-based nuclear delivery 
systems. China has been developing nuclear submarines with the capacity to launch submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) capable of striking the United States. The JL-2 SLBM has 
an estimated range of 7,400-8,000 km and is currently being readied for deployment (Federation 
of American Scientists, 1999b). The estimated number of JL-2 missiles varies widely from 48-96 
missiles in total (Kristensen, 2015). China’s Jin-class submarine, which will form the base of the 
Chinese nuclear submarine fleet, has recently been completed.  
The advantages of a nuclear submarine fleet are critical in regards to nuclear deterrence. 
While the JL-2 missile can only reach the west coast and Alaska from Chinese territory or 
coastal waters, a Chinese nuclear submarine could target any part of the continental United 
States from Hawaii (O’Rourke, 2016 p. 18). Nuclear submarines are very difficult to find and 
destroy, making it likely that China will be guaranteed a nuclear deterrence even in the event of a 
successful US nuclear first-strike. The United States is developing anti-submarine strategies, 
such as new submarine detection capabilities and strategic chokepoints to stop Chinese 
submarines in the western Pacific. In the event of a military confrontation with China, the United 
IJOIS Fall 2016, Volume II 
Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security 
62 
 
States, the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan could collectively mount an anti-submarine war in the 
Yellow Sea, the Ryukyu Islands, and the South China Sea, concentrating their efforts around key 
locations and thereby preventing Chinese nuclear submarines from reaching the high seas.  
However, China is currently preparing to send out a nuclear “deterrence patrol,”  which 
would begin long-range voyages throughout the Pacific (Baker, 2015). These submarines will be 
difficult to track and harder to destroy. If deployed first during peacetime, they would already be 
past the Pacific defensive lines in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. A single submarine 
could carry as many as 12 JL-2 SLBMs, ensuring that even one submarine could lay waste to a 
dozen American cities in the event of nuclear war (O’Rourke, 2016, p. 18). This submarine fleet 
would function as a serious deterrent to a nuclear first-strike against China. The Jin-class nuclear 
submarines, however, are known to be very noisy and are generally outclassed by opposing US 
submarines, making them vulnerable to a sea-based first-strike. (U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 2015, p. 347).  
Furthermore, the United States has been creating several anti-submarine systems. One of 
these is the Sea Hunter, an autonomous navy drone designed to track and follow enemy 
submarines, is intended to ensure that targets cannot avoid detection in the event of war (Pellerin, 
2016). Future US technological developments could potentially counter the relatively outdated 
Chinese sea-based deterrent before it is even deployed. Nevertheless, the development of a 
functional sea-based deterrent marks a major step towards China finally developing a nuclear 
triad and makes it even harder to neutralize China’s nuclear arsenal with a first-strike. 
Chinese Military Concerns 
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China’s security concerns continue to grow as the United States expands its military 
capabilities. China follows a no-first-use nuclear policy since 1964, in spite of a changing 
political and military landscape (China Daily, 2015). Because China’s nuclear arsenal is very 
small in comparison to the US arsenal (which contains over 7,000 nuclear weapons), the threat of 
a nuclear first-strike is still considered to be significant (Arms Control Association, 2014). The 
sheer number of US nuclear weapons has led planners to fear that a nuclear first strike could 
destroy some or all of the Chinese arsenal before it could be deployed against the United States.  
The United States has a wide variety of advanced delivery systems, early warning 
systems, and nuclear defense systems. A US strike can be launched from land-based nuclear 
silos, submarines, or by nuclear bombers while China is still struggling to develop any form of 
secure submarine deterrent. Many Chinese military scholars believe that China is at risk of a 
United States nuclear first-strike, a fear that could potentially lead to a major expansion of the 
Chinese nuclear arsenal as well as a potential shift away from China’s low-alert status of nuclear 
weaponry (Kulacki, 2016, p. 5) 
 The current US nuclear mentality is deeply worrying to China; In the view of Chinese 
experts, the US refusal to recognize its vulnerability to Chinese nuclear weapons is an indication 
that it seeks to develop the means to neutralize the Chinese nuclear program (Kulacki, 2016, p. 
1). The United States has spent billions of dollars attempting to develop an anti-ballistic missile 
(ABM) system; while this has largely been ineffective, American willingness to develop these 
ABM systems worries Chinese planners.  
The United States has been attempting to construct nuclear defense systems, such as the 
Aegis and THAAD anti-ballistic missile system, which could theoretically intercept Chinese 
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nuclear weapons en-route to the United States. Although it would not necessarily be directed at 
China, plans to deploy a THAAD system in South Korea to defend against North Korean nuclear 
weapons has elicited protests from the Chinese government. The Chinese government claims that 
such a system could be used against China’s nuclear arsenal and is thus an attack on China’s 
security and retaliatory capabilities (Missile Threat, 2015). Effective missile defenses on the 
Korean peninsula could weaken China’s offensive nuclear capabilities in Northeast Asia (despite 
THAAD’s limited range and effectiveness), and many Chinese military experts are worried by 
this prospect (The Interpreter, 2016). This has contributed to rising tensions between the United 
States and China.  
 Another potentially destabilizing factor is the development of a “Prompt Global Strike” 
system, which could potentially allow the United States to destroy any target inside China with 
non-nuclear missiles within hours (Woolf, 2014 p. 2). These missiles could target nuclear storage 
sites, missile silos, and military targets from US territory without the use of nuclear weapons. 
Just as with the anti-ballistic missile systems, PLA military experts have expressed concern over 
this neutralization strategy. A conventional first-strike by the United States could cripple China’s 
nuclear deterrent, leaving China unable to retaliate beyond conventional means. Due to the 
development of defensive strategies and alternative offensive measures by the United States, 
China has focused on the development of rail-launched nuclear missiles, as explained previously, 
and has been developing its submarine fleet. However, there are many in the People’s Liberation 
Army who do not believe that these measures are sufficient, and there have been calls by PLA 
military experts to shift China’s nuclear weapons onto a higher-alert status (Kulacki, 2016, p. 1) 
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Chinese Policy Changes and Nuclear False Alarms 
 Of the estimated 45 land-based nuclear weapons that can reach the United States, the 
majority are believed to be mobile solid-fuel rockets which can be launched fairly quickly. 
Unlike US missiles however, China’s missiles are on a low-alert status. This means that it could 
take several hours to authorize a nuclear launch, even if the nuclear missiles are attached to 
solid-fuel rockets. As such, a first-strike by the United States could lead to the destruction of 
China’s nuclear arsenal before it has a chance to launch a nuclear retaliation, a scenario that has 
not been lost on Chinese military experts. In 2013, the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences 
published The Science of Military Strategy (SMS), a comprehensive overview of Chinese 
military strategy and nuclear weapons policy (Kulacki, 2016, p. 4).  
This book, intended for Chinese readers, explains (among many other topics) China’s 
concerns with US policy and potential countermeasures. Strategists in the PLA call for shifting 
China’s nuclear weapons to hair-trigger alert, allowing them to be launched “on warning,” or 
after a missile launch has been detected, but before it reaches its target. The work references the 
ongoing development of an early-warning system to detect enemy nuclear missile launches, 
though it does not go into specifics. This lack of specificity is worrying because of a key risk in 
the field of global nuclear proliferation: nuclear false alarms. 
There have been several false alarms in which early-warning systems detected non-
existent nuclear missile launches, nearly resulting in nuclear war. The Union of Concerned 
Scientists has compiled several memorable and terrifying incidents: In 1980, a malfunctioning 
computer chip led to the detection of a Soviet nuclear missile launch, leading to the mobilization 
of the US nuclear bomber fleet (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016, p. 8). This could have 
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resulted in the deployment of nuclear bombers over Soviet territory, triggering a conventional or 
nuclear war. In 1983, sunlight reflecting off of clouds led a Soviet satellite to erroneously detect 
the launch of five nuclear missiles from the United States (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016, 
p. 7). This came at a period of high tensions between the two countries.  
Despite the alert, the Soviet officer in command of the early-warning system suspected 
that this was an error and did not report the launch. However, had he done so, the Soviet Union 
would have launched a nuclear strike against the United States. In 1995, a Norwegian rocket 
designed to study arctic aurora was detected by the Russian early warning system as a potential 
SLBM launch and was interpreted to be an attempt to damage Russian radar systems with a 
nuclear electro-magnetic pulse (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016, p. 8). While Norway had 
informed Russia of this rocket launch, the information had not reached the relevant authorities, 
nearly leading to Russia launching nuclear weapons at the United States. These are only a few of 
the accidental near-launches, all of which are a result of the hair-trigger status of nuclear 
weapons. The Chinese early-warning system is most likely in its infancy; should it detect an 
erroneous nuclear launch, China’s launch-on-warning policy could potentially lead to actual 
nuclear war.  
 One potential consequence of relying on early-warning systems for a launch-on-warning 
policy is that a first-strike by conventional missiles could also trigger an accidental launch. As 
the United States expands its Prompt Global Strike system, conventional missiles heading 
towards Chinese nuclear sites could be mistaken for nuclear weapons, even if launched at a 
depressed angle (unlike an ICBM, which launches at a much higher angle, though the previously 
mentioned Norwegian rocket also travelled at a depressed angle and was still believed to be a 
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nuclear weapon) (Woolf, 2016, p. 34). Should Chinese commanders mistake these missiles for a 
nuclear first strike, a conventional, non-nuclear war could escalate into nuclear conflict. 
 There have also been concerns, raised primarily by American military experts, that China 
may abandon its NFU policy. China’s nuclear submarine developments have concerned many 
US analysts that China may change its nuclear doctrine or that it may not to keep its pledges to 
limit nuclear weapons to retaliatory purposes. With a submarine deterrent, China could 
discontinue the policy because it is no longer necessary to keep China safe from a preemptive 
nuclear strike (Woolgar-James, 2015). However, China’s 2015 Military Defense Paper and the 
SMS both reference the NFU policy as the cornerstone of Chinese nuclear policy and show no 
indication of changing it.  
The SMS describes nuclear weapons as playing a relatively minor role in Chinese 
military strategy, even following a nuclear attack on China. China’s nuclear retaliation plans do 
not involve striking US military centers, but rather population centers. (Kulacki, 2015). The main 
reason behind this is that experts believe that China’s nuclear program is too small to 
successfully cripple the US military and thus is primarily a deterrence program. A successful 
Chinese nuclear retaliation would cause tens of millions of civilian casualties, ensuring that the 
cost of nuclear war with China would be too heavy for any nation to pay. A Chinese strike on an 
enemy’s military capabilities may not be successful and could leave China without an adequate 
nuclear deterrent. There is no conceivable reason to alter the NFU policy as China does not 
appear to be upgrading its nuclear weapons for battlefield use. Even though a shift of China’s 
nuclear weapons to a high-alert status is being considered, Chinese military experts do not 
appear to be abandoning the NFU policy. 
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Understanding Chinese nuclear development is critical in understanding China-US relations as 
well as the future of bilateral nuclear arms control. China’s nuclear program and its ongoing 
changes reflect the pressures that China faces from its rivals abroad. While China’s arsenal may 
be smaller and less advanced than the American arsenal, it is slowly approaching military parity. 
Shifting Chinese nuclear weapons to a high alert status, would make the world significantly less 
secure from the threat of nuclear war. It is vital to understand China’s nuclear policy along with 
the trajectory of its current development in order to understand the risks facing global stability 
and security. Perhaps with this understanding, US policies could be modified or abandoned in 
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